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AIR CARRIER LIABILITY FOR NUCLEAR DAMAGE*
By EDWIN 0. BAILEYt
I. INTRODUCTION
T WENTY-SIX years ago, on 2 December 1942, man first achieved a
self-sustaining chain reaction in a crude atomic pile and thereby
initiated the controlled release of nuclear energy.' Since that day, the
beneficial uses of nuclear energy as a source of power to replace fossil fuels
and in many other fields have become well-known.! Expectations for the
use of the atom in the future seem almost limitless.! In sum, nuclear energy
is and will continue to be a source of great social benefits. Counterpoised
to these expectations lies the unknown risk of potentially great harm to
the public due to the uncontrolled release of radiation. Estimates of the
magnitude of damage which could be caused by a nuclear accident stagger
the imagination.
* The views presented are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the
International Air Transport Association.
t A.B., Princeton University; J.D., Washington University; LL.M., McGill University; Assistant
to General Counsel, International Air Transport Association.
'Life with the Atom after Twenty-Five Years, U.S. NEws AND WORLD REPORT, Dec. 11,
1967, at 64; for another account of the development of the nuclear energy industry in the United
States, see: St. Clair, Should Foreign or Domestic Law Govern Liability for Damages from Nuclear
Incidents in the United States?, 32 INS. COUNSEL J. 142 (1965).
'In the United States alone, 16 atomic plants are generating power, 20 are being built, and
51 are on the drawing boards. More than 3,000 U.S. hospitals are using more than 30 radioisotopes
to prevent disease. U.S. NEws AND WORLD REPORT, Dec. 11, 1967 at 64.
aBy 1980, one-third of all electric power in the U.S. will come from nuclear energy. Twenty
years later, the figure will be fifty per cent. By then, new Breeder reactors will be making fuel at
a faster rate than they consume it. Nuclear explosives will be evacuating harbors and canals, and
underground explosions will increase the production of natural gas. In the oceans nuclear power
will pump up and process mineral wealth. Nuclear ships will harvest food from the seas. De-salted
water from the oceans will irrigate the deserts and increase the world's tillable land. In outer space,
nuclear powered rockets may carry men to the moon, and help make it habitable. Id.
4 In 1957, the United States Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) published the Brookhaven Re-
port on the possibilities and consequences of accidents in nuclear power plants. According to this
report, the likelihood of an accident ranged from "a chance of one in one hundred thousand to one
in one thousand million per year of each large reactor." In the case of an accident occurring, "the-
oretical estimates indicated that personal damage might range, from a lower limit of none injured
or killed to an upper limit, in the worst case, of about thirty-four hundred killed and forty-three
thousand injured." In the "worst case," property damage could amount to $7 billion. See generally:
United States AEC, REPORT ON THEORETICAL POSSIBILITIES AND CONSEQUENCES OF MAJOR AccI-
DENTS IN LARGE NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS (1957); also, Hardy, International Protection Against
Nuclear Risks, 10 INT'L AND COMP. L.Q. 739, 740-41 (1961). The Brookhaven estimates have
recently been criticized as being far below the potential damage which might result today from an
accident in the considerably larger plants which are now being built. See, HEARINGS ON PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS TO PRICE-ANDERSON ACT RELATING To WAIVER OF DEFENSES BEFORE THE JOINT
COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 144, 151 (1966) as cited in The New Price-
Anderson: Is the United States Moving Toward Internation Agreement on Nuclear Indemnity?,
7 VA. J. INT'L L. 157 (1966). The possibility of damage being done to food supplies at a distance
of 380 miles has also been reported at the 1958 Geneva Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic
Energy. Hardy, Nuclear Liability: The General Principles of Law and Further Proposals, 36 BRIT.
YEAR BOOK INT'L L. 223, 225 (1960). In fact, the Brookhaven estimates have yet to be tested by
experience. Raney, The Atom and the Law-Circas. 1966, 47 CHI. B. REC. 317, 320-21 (1966).
Compared to automobile traffic, flying, mining and some other common activities, radiation is a
minor hazard. O'Toole, Radiation, Causation, and Compensation, 54 GEo. L.J. 751, 754 & 761
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This conflict between the expectations and the possible harm from the
uses of nuclear energy calls for basic policy answers on the legal principles
which should be adopted to regulate and assign responsibility for nuclear
damage. For, unless liability principles governing nuclear activity are
clear and practical, it is conceivable that the sheer exposure to potentially
great losses will stifle private and public endeavor in this field.! In more
precise terms, a way must be found to provide realistic financial protection
for the public, and, at the same time, permit the young nuclear energy
industry and those participating in it to be unfettered by unlimited lia-
bility. Moreover, these conditions must be achieved not only in the muni-
cipal laws, but also (and perhaps more importantly) in the form of uni-
form international standards!
Some progress in fulfilling these objectives has already been made in
the form of international agreements which attempt to accommodate
divergent national interests by establishing minimum standards of finan-
cial protection for the public and by setting limits of liability for those
responsible within the bounds of available insurance and governmental
indemnities. These conventions include the Paris Convention of 29 July
1960, covering Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy
(hereinafter referred to as the Paris or OECD Convention); the Vienna
Convention of 29 April 1963, dealing with Civil Liability for Nuclear
Damage (hereinafter referred to as the Vienna or IAEA Convention); and
the Draft Conventions of the Inter-American Nuclear Energy Commis-
sion (hereinafter referred to as the Draft IANEC Conventions).' None
(1966). In the five-year period, 1957-1961, there were only thirty-one minor nuclear incidents on
the "several hundred thousand shipments of radioactive substances in the United States under the
jurisdiction of the Atomic Energy Commission." Ely, Nuclear Liability, Limitations and Indemni-
fication, 30 INS. COUNSEL J. 2217 (1963). See also, Baldwin, Changes of Nuclear Mishap Viewed
as Infinitesimal, 8 ATOMIC ENERGY L.J. 21, 28. From 1943 to 1964 in all AEC plants there have
been 88 accidental fatalities, only three of which have been attributed to radiation. A total of
7,693 persons were injured in the same period, 36 of them by radiation. BALDWIN, supra.
'In searching for the "general principles of law recognized by civilised nations" which would
govern nuclear liability, Hardy has concluded as follows: "Applying this test, it is submitted that
the principle of strict liability, i.e., liability independent of proof of either intention or negligence,
has been adopted in one form or another by all modern legal systems in order to regulate responsi-
bility for the creation of ultra-hazardous risks." He is of the opinion that nuclear activities con-
stitute such risks. Hardy, Nuclear Liability, supra note 4, at 237. The maximum amount of avail-
able commercial insurance in the United States for nuclear incidents was $74 million as of I Jan.
1966. H.R. REP. No. 883, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1965), as cited in The New Price-Anderson,
supra note 4, at 164. The private insurance companies in Latin America may not be able to cover
risks of more than $1 million (U.S.). REPORT OF THE SPECIAL LEGAL COMMITTEE ON CIVIL LI-
ABILITY IN THE FIELD OF NUCLEAR ENERGY, Inter-American Nuclear Energy Commission, 37
(1967).
6 The importance of uniform or harmonious national laws on nuclear liability and indemnity
is underscored by the numerous international arrangements which already exist amongst states for
cooperation in nuclear research, establishment of nuclear installations and in the supplying of nu-
clear materials. It has been calculated that the United States alone will provide goods between one
and one-half billion dollars to several European states engaged in nuclear research before 1970.
Hardy, Nuclear Liability, supra note 4, at 224. See also, Gorove, Controls Over Atoms-for-Peace:
U.S. Bilateral Agreements with Other Nations, 4 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT. L. 181 (1966).
"The Paris Convention, including the Supplementary Convention of 31 Jan. 1963, to the Paris
Convention of 29 July 1960, incorporating the provisions of the Additional Protocol signed in Paris
on 28 Jan. 1964, and the Draft Conventions of the Inter-American Nuclear Energy Commission
may be found in the REPORT OF SPECIAL LEGAL COMMITTEE ON CIVIL LIABILITY IN THE FIELD OF
NUCLEAR ENERGY, Inter-American Nuclear Energy Commission, at 131, 155, 71 and 87. Six-
teen European States signed the Paris Convention on 29 July 1960, and as of 7 Aug. 1967,
the OECD had received the ratifications of Turkey, Spain, the United Kingdom, France and Bel-
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of these are as yet in force, but both Paris and Vienna are expected to
reach this stage in the near future.' All of these conventions (which,
unfortunately, are not entirely compatible) extend to the area of liability
of air carriers for nuclear damage caused during the transportation of the
sources of nuclear energy.9 This raises the spector of conflict with existing
and contemplated treaties governing air carrier liability, e.g., the Warsaw
Convention and that Convention as amended by the Hague Protocol (and
the 1966 inter-carrier agreement on personal liability), the Rome Conven-
tion of 1952, and the draft Collisions Convention. 0 It is also conceivable
that the nuclear liability treaties have not covered all aspects of this type of
air carrier liability, either through oversight, design, or choice of language.
This paper will examine the substantive and adjectival law of the
nuclear liability conventions insofar as it pertains to air carrier liability
for the carriage of nuclear materials. Special attention is given to provi-
sions which may, either directly or indirectly, result in unusual air carrier
liability under the conventions or in spite of the conventions and under
the municipal laws of the various contracting parties. Recommendations
are made on (1) how the conventions might be amended in the interests
of air carriers, and (2) how air carriers may take measures to protect
themselves until changes in the conventions are instituted. A topical
gium. The Treaty will come into effect when five States have also ratified the Additional Protocol
of 28 Jan. 1964. Of the five States which have ratified the Agreement, only Turkey has not ac-
cepted the Protocol. Source: Legal Department, OECD, Paris. See also, NUCLEAR LEGISLATIONS,
ANALYTICAL STUDY, NUCLEAR THIRD PARTY LIABILITY, European Nuclear Energy Agency, OECD,
8 (1967). The IANEC Drafts will not be submitted to a diplomatic conference until the Vienna
Convention goes into force and has been ratified by a "reasonable number of American States."
REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE, supra, at 69. The text of the Vienna Convention
appears at page 109 of the report. Although fifty-eight States were represented at the Diplomatic
Conference on 20 May 1963, only China, Colombia, the Philippines, Yugoslavia, Spain, the United
Kingdom, Cuba, the United Arab Republic, and Argentina signed the treaty. Cuba, the United Arab
Republic, the Philippines, and Argentina have ratified the Convention. It will come into effect
three months after the deposit of the fifth instrument of ratification. Letter from Mr. Werner
Boulanger, Director, Legal Division, IAEA, Vienna, dated 31 July 1967.
'The Vienna Convention is open to accession by all members of the United Nations, any State
which is a member of any of the United Nations Specialized Agencies, or any State which is a
member of the International Atomic Energy Agency and was not represented at the International
Conference on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage which drafted the Vienna Convention. The Paris
Convention (and the Supplementary Convention thereto) is regional in nature and is open to ac-
cession of right only by members or associates of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development. While any other nation may accede to the Paris Convention, such accession is predi-
cated upon the unanimous assent of the Contracting Parties. The draft IANEC Conventions relate
to the Organization of American States, and accession thereto is limited to the American States.
'For a general discussion and comparison of these conventions, See, Cigoj, International Regula-
tion of Civil Liability for Nuclear Risks, 14 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 809 (1965).
"aThe Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by
Air, Warsaw, 12 Oct. 1929, as amended at The Hague, 1955; Agreement Relating to Liability Limi-
tations of the Warsaw Convention and the Hague Protocol, CAB Docket No. 17325, CAB Order
No. E-23680 (13 May 1966); The Convention on Damage Caused by Foreign Aircraft to Third
Parties on the Surface, Rome, 7 Oct. 1952; the draft Convention on Aerial Collisions, ICAO Doc.
No. 8444-LC/l5l, reprinted in 30 J. AIR L. & COM. 385 (1964). The 1966 Inter-carrier Agree-
ment is reprinted in 33 J. AIR L. & COM. 150 (1967). A comparison of the Paris and Vienna Con-
ventions with the private air law conventions is made by Cabranes, Limitations of Liability in In-
ternational Air Law: The Warsaw and Rome Conventions Reconsidered, 15 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.
660, 679-83 (1966). The United States Atomic Energy Commission apparently does not keep lists
of the number of nuclear incidents involving air transportation. The United States Defense De-
partment, on the other hand, has a list of 12 "major" accidents involving air carriage of nuclear
weapons and at least four additional such incidents have been publicly reported. BALoWIN, supra
note 4, at 21.
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approach has been chosen owing to the complexity of the conventions
and the number of separate matters of legal interest which they cover.
II. THE DESIGN OF THE CONVENTIONS
Before commencing a detailed analysis of the various provisions of the
conventions which relate to air carrier liability, it may be instructive for
the reader to consider in general terms the basic design and scope of the
legal regimes which they would create. All of the agreements are predicated
on two objectives: (1) protecting the nuclear energy industry from lia-
bility which it is not financially capable of assuming, and (2) providing
realistic financial indemnification of the public for loss due to a nuclear
incident." According to the drafters, these objectives may best be met by
channelling all liability for nuclear damage to the operator of a nuclear
installation who is required to be financially able to meet this liability up
to the limits established in the conventions.
A. Operators And Operations Delineated
The "operator of a nuclear installation" is defined for this purpose as
"the person designated or recognized by the Installation State as the
operator of that installation."'" The operator's liability extends to damage
"The Preamble of the Paris Convention of 29 July 1960 provides for "unifying the basic rules
applying to the various countries to the liability incurred for such damage, whilst leaving these
countries free to take, on a national basis, any additional measures which they deem appropriate"
by "insuring adequate and equitable compensation for persons who suffer damage caused by nuclear
incidents, whilst taking the necessary steps to ensure that the development of the production and
uses of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is not thereby hindered." The preambles to the other
Conventions are less explicit. The Vienna Convention only mentions "the desirability of establishing
some minimum standards to provide financial protection against damage resulting from certain
peaceful uses of nuclear energy." For this reason, some commentators seem to have the idea that
there is a distinction between the purposes of the Paris and the other conventions. See, e.g., The
New Price-Anderson, supra note 4, at 159. A comparison of the substantive matter of the conven-
tions, however, would not seem to support this view.
1"Vienna Convention, art. I(1) (c); Paris Convention, art. 1(a) (vi); IANEC Drafts are the
same as Vienna. "Nuclear Incident" in Vienna is defined as "any occurrence or series of occurrences
having the same origin which causes nuclear damage." Vienna Convention, art. 1(1) (1) The IANEC
Drafts employ the Vienna language. The Paris Convention definition of "Nuclear Incident" is some-
what broader and incorporates, in some measure, a definition of "Nuclear Damage": "any occurrence
or succession of occurrences having the same origin which causes damage, provided that such oc-
currence or successsion of occurrences, or any of the damage caused arises out of or results from
the radioactive properties, or a combination of radioactive properties with toxic, explosive, or other
hazardous properties of nuclear fuel or radioactive products or waste or with any of them." Paris
Convention, art. I(a) (1). The Vienna Convention defines "Nuclear Damage" as: "(i) loss of life,
any personal injury or any loss of, or damage to, property which arises out of or results from the
radioactive properties or a combination of radioactive properties with toxic, explosive, or other
hazardous properties of nuclear fuel or radioactive products or waste in, or of nuclear material
coming from, originating in, or sent to, a nuclear installation; (ii) any other loss or damage so
arising or resulting if and to the extent that the law of the competent court so provides; and
(iii) if the law of the Installation State so provides, loss of life, any personal injury or any loss of,
or damage to, property which arises out of or results from other ionizing radiation emitted by any
other source of radiation inside a nuclear installation." Vienna Convention, art. I(1) (k). The
IANEC Drafts use the Vienna definition of "Nuclear Damage." The Paris Convention does not de-
fine "Nuclear Damage" as such; however, art. 3(c) is the same as Vienna Convention, art.
1(1) (k) (iii). A "Nuclear Installation" under the Vienna Convention is: "(i) any nuclear reactor
other than one with which a means of sea or air transport is equipped for use as a source of power,
whether for propulsion thereof or for any other purpose; (ii) any factory using nuclear fuel for
the production of nuclear material, or any factory for the processing of nuclear material, including
any factory for the reprocessing of irradiated nuclear fuel; and (iii) any facility where nuclear
material is stored, other than storage incidental to the carriage of such material; provided that the
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caused at the installation as well as during the transportation of nuclear
goods to or from the installation. Damage due to ionizing radiation is not
included in the conventions as written, but States are permitted to hold
the operator liable for such damage under their national laws."a Contract-
ing Parties are also permitted to enact legislation in accordance with which
a carrier transporting nuclear material may be designated or recognized as
the "operator" of a nuclear installation. Should this happen, the carrier
would be considered for all purposes under the conventions as an operator
of a nuclear installation situated within the territory of the designating
Contracting Party.4
B. Theory Of Liability
The liability imposed upon the operator of a nuclear installation is
absolute-the claimant is not required to prove fault. His only burden is to
show that the damage was caused by the nuclear incident. 5 There may
be, however, specific exceptions to the operator's liability. He may be
exonerated upon proof that the damage resulted from an "act or omis-
sion" of the claimant performed with the intent to cause the damage.
(In this respect, the liability of the operator of a nuclear installation
resembles that of the operator of an aircraft under the terms of the Rome
Convention of 1952."7) This release from liability is not guaranteed by
the conventions, however, and will be granted only if the law of a
competent court so prescribes. In the absence of a contrary national law,
the operator may also avoid liability under the terms of the conventions
in the case where the damage was due to a nuclear incident directly caused
by a "grave natural disaster of an exceptional character."'" Furthermore,
the operator is released from liability for nuclear damage caused by war
and insurrection, regardless of local law. 9
Installation State may determine that several nuclear installations of one operator which are located
at the same site shall be considered as a single nuclear installation." Vienna Convention, art. I(1) (j).
The IANEC Drafts are identical. The Paris definition of "Nuclear Installation" differs from that
in the other conventions only to the extent that the Steering Committee of the European Nuclear
Energy Agency has the power to designate "other installations in which there are nuclear fuel or
radioactive products or waste" as it shall determine from time to time. Paris Convention, art.
1 (a) (ii).
" Vienna Convention, art. 1(1) (k) (iii); IANEC Drafts are the same as Vienna; Paris Conven-
tion, art. 3 (c) and Preamble.
4 Vienna Convention, art. II(2); Paris Convention, art. 4(d); IANEC Drafts are identical to
Vienna. The provision in the Paris Convention was inserted at the insistence of the Italian delegation;
See, Note by the Secretariat for the Meeting of Government Experts, on 7 Dec. 1959, SEN (59)
83, at 3, Paris, 4 Nov. 1959.
sa "The liability of the operator for nuclear damage under this convention shall be absolute."
Vienna Convention, art. IV(1); IANEC Drafts are identical. The Paris Convention does not use
the term "absolute" in describing the operator's liability; nevertheless, the operator's responsibility
is the same as that in the other conventions. Paris Convention, art. 3(a).
" Vienna Convention, art. IV(2); IANEC Drafts are almost identical to Vienna; the Paris Con-
vention differs from the others in that the operator may not be exonerated where the damage was
caused by the gross negligence of the person suffering the damage. Paris Convention, art. 6(f) and
(g). While the operator would be exonerated with respect to these particular claimants, he would
continue to be liable to non-culpable persons through doctrine of "channelling."
"Rome Convention, art. 12(i).
" Vienna Convention, art. IV(3) (b); IANEC Drafts are identical to Vienna; Paris Convention,
art. 9.
,' Vienna Convention, art. IV (3) (a); IANEC Drafts are identical to Vienna; Paris Convention,
art. 9.
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In sum, the operator's liability may be described as independent of
culpability. In this respect it resembles that which has been adopted in
one form or another by most modern legal systems for the purpose of
assigning responsibility for the creation of ultra-hazardous risks" (par-
ticularly in the United States and in many nations in Europe)." Although
claimants need only prove damage and cause-in-fact, the operator is given
limited recourse rights against other persons in several instances: (1)
where the claimant's act or omission with intent to cause damage caused
the nuclear incident, and (2) where the right of recourse is given to the
operator expressly by contract.
C. Minimum And Maximum Limitations Of Liability
The assignment of public responsibility to the operator of a nuclear
installation meets one of the objectives of the conventions. The second is
achieved by a limitation of that liability. Thus, while the public is pro-
tected from activities involving the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the
amount of this protection is finite and not contingent, thereby permitting
endeavours in the field to proceed unimpeded. Under the Paris Conven-
tion, the operator's maximum liability with respect to damage caused by a
" Hardy, Nuclear Liability, supra note 4, at 237. The United States RESTATEMENT OF TORTS,
§ 519, reads: "one who carries on an ultra-hazardous activity is liable to another whose person,
land or chattels the author should recognize as likely to be harmed by the unpreventable miscar-
riage of the activity for harm resulting thereto, from that which makes the activity ultra-
hazardous, although the utmost care is exercised to prevent the harm." An activity is "ultra-
hazardous" under the RESTATEMENT "if it (a) necessarily involves a risk of serious harm to the
person, land or chattels of others which cannot be eliminated by the exercise of the utmost care,
and (b) is not a matter of common usage." RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, Vol. 3, §§ 519-20 (1948).
" For a comparison of national laws on liability for nuclear damage caused by nuclear incidents,
see, Nuclear Liability Legislation in the United States and Europe, 13 STAN. L. REV. 865 (1961).
Nine nations have statutes governing liability for nuclear damage: Austria, Germany, Italy, Japan,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. For a recent introduction
to the Austrian law, see, Moser, Gantt, Ettinger & Breslauer, The Austrian Law on Liability for
Damages Caused by Atomic Energy, 26 FED. B.J. 280 (1966). The new amendments to the Price-
Andersn Act in the United States under which operators of nuclear installations waive certain de-
fences are explained in The New Price-Anderson, supra note 4, and Trosten & England, Waiving
Refenses: A New Approach to Protecting hie Public Against Financial Loss From Use of Atomic
Energy, 27 FEn. B.J. 27 (1967). It is interesting to note that the Vienna Conference debates indi-
cated the feeling that even though selection of the liable party was to a certain extent arbitrary,
a decision which would require operators, suppliers and others to insure would cause wasteful pyra-
miding of insurance in an industry which had little experience upon which to base ratings and
premiums. The New Price-Anderson, supra note 4, at 161. The Report of the Special Legal Com-
mittee on Civil Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy of the IANEC does not indicate a conflict
of opinions on whether liability should be "channelled" solely to the operator. Finally, insurance
considerations seem to have weighed heavily on the decision of the European Nuclear Energy Agency
of the OECD when it decided that the operator should be solely liable. SEN (59) 79, European
Nuclear Energy Agency, OECD, Paris, 23 Oct. 1959. The Exposi des Motifs to the Paris Con-
vention also suggest that the channelling of liability to the operator of a nuclear installation was
prompted by the desire to avoid "difficult and lengthy questions of complicated legal cross-actions
to establish in individual cases who is legally liable." Paris, Exposi des Motifs, 15.
2 Vienna Convention, art. X; Paris Convention, art. 6(f). The IANEC Drafts contain alterna-
tive provisions for rights of recourse. The first alternative is identical to the Vienna Convention
language. The second would provide recourse against third parties: "The operator shall have a right
of recourse against any person who has manufactured materials or equipment for, or who has fur-
nished materials, equipment and services in connection with the design, construction, repair or
operation of a nuclear installation, or who has transported or stored nuclear material, for fault of
such person." The IAEA Official Records indicate that the Vienna Conference discussed the possi-
bility of recourse against suppliers, but rejected it on the grounds that it would be virtually im-
possible to identify the faulty component which had cause dthe damage. See IAEA Official Records
135-38, 293-302.
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nuclear incident is 15 million European Monetary Agreement Units of
Account (United States dollars), unless States by legislation wish to
provide for a higher amount. In no event, however, may an operator's
liability be less than 5 million Units of Account." The Paris Supplementary
Convention requires national coverage to $70 million, with an additional
$50 million to be made available from an international pool. 4 In contrast
with the Paris scheme, the Vienna Convention establishes only a minimum
limit of liability of $5 million for any one nuclear incident." The IANEC
Drafts also only mention a minimum figure, but the dollar amount will
be decided at a future diplomatic conference." Both the Vienna Conven-
tion and the IANEC Drafts require the Installation State to insure the
payment of claims for compensation for nuclear damage to the extent
that the operator's own insurance is not adequate to cover such claims,
but not in excess of the minimum limits established by the conventions.
The Paris Convention does not contain such a provision, but the Supple-
mentary Convention would seem to presume that States would guarantee
at least the minimum limitation under Paris." '
D. Extinguishing Causes Of Action
Because of the peculiar and often delayed manifestation of radiation
injury, the conventions provide for relatively long periods of time
before the right to bring suit is extinguished. Under Vienna and the
IANEC Drafts, actions may be brought up to ten years from the date
of the incident, unless the Installation State provides a longer period to
accord with the operator's insurance coverage.' Paris establishes a com-
parable period of time. In addition to this allowance, Paris permits Installa-
tion States to legislate an extinguishment period of not less than two years
from the date on which the claimant had knowledge or should have had
knowledge about the damage upon which the claim is based. Under Vienna
and the IANEC Drafts, Installation States may provide for a period of
not less than three years for the same circumstances." Where the nuclear
damage is caused by a nuclear incident involving nuclear goods which
were stolen, lost, jettisoned, or abandoned, the period under all of the
21 Paris Convention, art. 7 (a), (b) and (g).
24 Convention Supplementary to the Paris Convention, art. 3(a), (b). See, Book Review, 16
INr'L & CoMp. L.Q. 564 (1967).
25Vienna Convention, art. V(i).
2 IANEC Draft "A," art. V(i) (4) (5) (6); Draft "B," art. 4(i) (4) (5) (6).
21 Vienna Convention, art. V1I(i) (2); IANEC Drafts are virtually identical to the Vienna pro-
visions; Paris Convention, art. 10 (a) (b) (c). Supplementary Convention, art. 3 (a) (b) (c). The
Price-Anderson Act in the United States provides for governmental indemnity up to amounts of
$500 million in excess of the private insurance required for each incident. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(c)
(Supp. 1, 1965) as amended 13 Oct. 1966, by Pub. L. 89-645, 80 Stat. 891. The United States
representatives at the Vienna Conference took the view that the liability limits established in the
convention were unrealistically low in view of the potential damage which might be caused by
a nuclear incident. For this reason, several writers have doubted whether the United States can
participate in the Vienna Convention. See, e.g., Cavers, Improving Financial Protection of the Pub-
lic Against the Hazards of Nuclear Power, 77 HARV. L. REv. 644, 680-82 (1964); The New Price-
Anderson, supra note 4, at 162.
" Vienna Convention, art. VI(1); IANEC Drafts employ identical language.
'Vienna Convention, art. VI(3); IANEC Drafts use the same language as Vienna; Paris Con-
vention, art. 8(a) (c).
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conventions may extend for a period of twenty years from the date of
the incident."
E. Jurisdiction
A final distinguishing aspect of the design of the conventions should
be mentioned. This aspect is the matter of jurisdiction over actions
arising under the conventions. In most cases, the courts of the Contracting
Party within whose territory the nuclear incident occurred have juris-
diction over the actions."1 In this respect, the conventions look to the
simplicity of the Rome Convention of 1952, rather than the complexity
created by the numerous jurisdictions of the Warsaw Convention." If,
however, the incident occurred outside the territory of a Contracting
State, or, if the place of the incident cannot be determined with certainty,
jurisdiction lies with the court of the Installation State of the "operator
liable." '3
III. LIABILITY OF AIR CARRIERS FOR NUCLEAR DAMAGE OCCURRING
DURING THE CARRIAGE OF NUCLEAR GOODS
As in the case of suppliers, repairmen, and other contractors dealing
with the operator of a nuclear installation, air carriers also benefit from
the exoneration from liability which the conventions afford through the
doctrine of "channelling" liability to the operator. But, because treaties
governing air carrier liability already are in existence and in force, and
for other reasons which will be noted below, air carriers may still be
directly liable for damage caused by a nuclear incident during the trans-
portation of nuclear materials in certain instances."
A. Liability Of The Operator Of A Nuclear Installation For Damage
Caused During The Air Carriage Of Nuclear Goods
In keeping with the design of the conventions, the operator of a nuclear
installation is primarily responsible for harm to third parties which may
so Vienna Convention, art. VI(2) ; Paris Convention, art. 8 (b); The IANEC Drafts are identical
to the Vienna language.
31Vienna Convention, art. XI(1); IANEC adopt the Vienna language; Paris Convention, art.
13 (a).
32 Rome Convention, art. 20(1); Warsaw Convention, art. 28(1).
" Vienna Convention, art. XI(2); IANEC Drafts are identical to the Vienna language; Paris
Convention, art. 13(b). The conventions also provide for settling disputes where jurisdiction would
lie with the courts of more than one Contracting State. Vienna Convention, art. XI(3) (a) (b);
Paris Convention, art. 13(c) (i) (ii). The IANEC Drafts go so far as to establish an arbitration
procedure in the event that a dispute over jurisdiction cannot be settled within three months from
the date of discovery of a plurality of jurisdictions. IANEC "A," art. XI(3) (b); Draft "B," art. 7.
" In the absence of special contractual arrangements dealing with ultimate liability, the present
situation of the common law would normally find the carrier of goods liable for damage caused
to third parties. Paris Convention, Expos6 des Motifs, 5 22. In the United States, the liability
for incidents occurring during the course of transportation is, under the Price-Anderson amend-
ments, dependent upon local or the common law of the various states within the United States. In
the few reported cases where third parties have attempted to hold carriers (not air carriers) strictly
liable for the damage caused by hazardous cargo, the courts have denied such liability. See, e.g.,
Fidelity and Deposit Company v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 275 F. 922 (3d Cir. 1921) (fire in freight
yard leading to explosion of thirty-three carloads of munitions) as cited in Nuclear Liability Legis-
lation, supra note 21, at 877-78. There is at present no special legislation in Canada on third party
liability in the field of nuclear energy. Nuclear Legislations, supra note 7, at 23.
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occur during the transportation of the sources of nuclear energy to or
from his installation. The problem under the conventions is to decide
which operator, the consignor or the consignee, is liable. In principle, the
conventions have imposed the liability on the operator who would most
likely be responsible for the packing and containment of the nuclear sub-
stances, that is, the sending or consigning operator." The consigning
operator would also be in a better position to insure that the consignments
comply with the health and safety regulations laid down for transport."
All of the conventions follow the same pattern in stating the operator's
liability for the carriage of nuclear materials." Where the consignee is
another operator of a nuclear installation in a Contracting State, the
consigning operator remains liable until the consignee has "taken charge"
of the nuclear substances."8 If, however, the materials are consigned to a
destination in a non-Contracting State, the rules governing the consignor-
operator's liability change because the conventions do not impose liability
upon persons not subject to the jurisdiction of the Contracting Parties."9
" Paris, Exposi des Motifs, 5 23. The Paris Convention uses the term "nuclear substances" to
describe the nuclear goods which are carried; Vienna, on the other hand, employes the term "nu-
clear materials." Paris Convention, art. 1(a) (v); Vienna Convention, art. 1(1) (h). The IANEC
Drafts follow the Vienna language. Basically, the terms have the same meaning and include nuclear
fuel (other than natural uranium and depleted uranium) and radioactive products or waste.
3 The Expos6 des Motifs to the Paris Convention offer the following additional reasons for
holding the operator of a nuclear installation rather than the carrier liable: "It would seem normal,
in the case of transport, for the carrier to be the person liable .. . however, in the case of radio-
active materials, very special considerations are involved. The carrier will generally not be in a
position to verify the precautions in packing and containment taken by the person sending the
materials. Moreover, if the carrier is to be liable he will have to obtain the necessary insurance cov-
erage in respect of potential high liability, and this would result in increased transport charges
for the operator. Transport insurance ordinarily covers only the value of the goods transported,
i.e., their loss or destruction, and does not extend to damage which such goods may cause to third
persons." Interestingly enough, certain insurers have taken the position that the carriers is tanta-
mount to a third party in relation to the operator and that the carrier should not, therefore, be
permitted to seek indemnification or have an immunity if it had assumed the risk of carrying nu-
clear materials. Others, also representing insurance groups, have taken the view that if the proper
protection of the public is to be the real object of the exercise, then the most effective underwriting
and the maximum insurance coverage could be obtained only if one single line of the whole risk
were underwritten, other than splitting underwriters' commitments to cargo, the carrying vehicle,
and other carrier liabilities. SEN (59) 79, European Nuclear Energy Agency, OECD, Paris, 23
Oct. 1959.
", Vienna Convention, art. II(1)(b)(ii); Paris Convention, art. 4(a)(ii); the IANEC Drafts
are the same as the Vienna Convention, with certain exceptions which will be noted below.
" Vienna Convention, art. II(1)(b)(ii); Paris Convention, art. 4(a)(ii); the IANEC drafts
would not apply in this case if the consignor were subject to the IANEC Convention and the con-
signee were subject to Vienna. IANEC Draft "A," art. II(1); Draft "B," art. 3. All of the con-
ventions provide that the consignee may assume liability under these circumstances at another time
pursuant to the express terms of a contract in writing. Vienna Convention, art. 11(1) (b) (i); Paris
Convention, art. 4(a)(i). The conventions also stipulate that where the nuclear substances or ma-
terial are "intended to be used in a nuclear reactor with which a means of transport is equipped
for use as a source of power, either for propulsion thereof or for any other purpose," the consign-
ing operator remains liable until the "person duly authorized to operate such reactor has taken
charge" of the nuclear material or substances. Vienna Convention, art. II(1)(b)(iii); Paris Con-
vention, art. 4(a) (iii).
" Paris Convention, art. 2 reads: "This convention does not apply to nuclear incidents occurring
in the territory of non-Contracting States or to damage suffered in such territory, unless otherwise
provided by the legislation of the Contracting Party in whose territory the nuclear installation of
the operator liable is situated, and except in regard to rights referred to in Art. 6 (e)." The Vienna
Convention does not include a comparable provision, nor do the IANEC Drafts. The concern of the
IANEC and IAEA seems to be with conflict of conventions, rather than the conflict between the
conventions and the law of non-Contracting States. REPORT OF THE SPECIAL LEGAL COMMITTEE,
supra note 5, at 65. The absence of a provision comparable to art. 2 of Paris in both the IANEC
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In this case, the conventions provide that the liability of the sending
operator would end when the materials have been unloaded from the
means of carriage by which they have been transported into the territory
of a non-Contracting State." It should be noted that there is an incon-
sistency between the theory that the conventions apply to the territory
of the Contracting Parties and the just-mentioned provisions which would
hold the consignor-operator liable for a nuclear incident until the materials
have been unloaded from the means of transport by which they have
arrived in the territory of a non-Contracting State.4' This inconsistency
is partially neutralized by an exception which grants certain carriers rights
of recourse against operators where the incident occurred in the territory
of a non-Contracting State." More will be said about these recourse rights
below.
Because the conventions would prefer to hold the sending operator
liable, that operator will have, in the event of a lawsuit, the burden of
showing that some other operator had actually taken charge of the nuclear
substances. " The operative phrase "has taken charge of" as used in the
conventions would normally be construed by the competent court;
44
however, nothing in the conventions precludes the Contracting Parties
from making requirements which "deem" that the operators of nuclear
installations for whom substances are carried from abroad "take the
substances in charge" the moment they have reached their territories.'
In the case where the nuclear materials are sent from the territory of
a non-Contracting State, the operator-consignee becomes liable under the
conventions only after the nuclear materials have been "loaded" on the
means of transport by which they are to be carried from that territory.
The rationale of the conventions in thus extending the operator-con-
signee's liability is to provide that there will always be someone liable
within the territory of one of the Contracting Parties." Again, there seems
to be an inconsistency between the apparent geographical or jurisdictional
Drafts and Vienna does not imply that the latter apply to nuclear incidents occurring in the terri-
tory of non-Contracting States.
40 Vienna Convention, art. I (1) (b) (iv) ; Paris Convention, art. 4 (a) (iv).
41 The term "territory" as used in the conventions includes the territorial waters of states. See,
Paris Convention, Exposd des Motifs, 5 7. While the conventions do not apply to nuclear incidents
occurring in the territory of a non-Contracting State, or to damage suffered in that territory, na-
tional legislation may provide otherwise. Id.
42 Vienna Convention, art. IX (2) (a); Paris Convention, art. 6(e); IANEC Drafts are the same
as Vienna. Paris, Exposd des Motifs, 5 7.
4 Vienna Convention, art. II(1) (c) (ii); IANEC Drafts are identical to the Vienna Convention;
Paris Convention, arts. 3(a) & 4(b) (ii).
44 Paris, Expos des Motifs, 5 24.
4 Id., 5 31. Such legislation may be expected in the case where the sending party has a person
operating a nuclear reactor with which a means of transport is equipped for use as a source of
propulsion; Vienna Convention, art. II(1) (c) (iii); IANEC Drafts are identical to the Vienna Con-
vention; Paris Convention, art. 4(b) (iii). Or where special written contractual arrangements are
in effect for the carriage. Vienna Convention, art. 11(1) (c) (i); IANEC Drafts are identical to
Vienna; Paris Convention, art. 4(b) (i).
SVienna Convention, art. II(1)(c)(iv); IANEC Drafts are identical to Vienna; Paris Con-
vention, art. 3 (b) (iv) ; Paris, Exposd des Motifs, 5 26. It is interesting to note that the liability
in this case is imposed upon the operator for whom the materials are destined, only when he has
given his prior written consent to the sending of the materials. It is precisely this kind of detail
which air carriers must be aware of in order to gain any benefits of immunity from liability under
these conventions.
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scope of the operator's liability and the purported design of the conven-
tions which hold that they would not apply to incidents or damage occur-
ring in the territory of a non-Contracting State. If the incident occurred
after loading but before the materials were actually outside of the territory
of a non-Contracting State, it is difficult to see how carriers could assert
that the law governing the accident was that provided by the conven-
tions. 7 (At best, carriers would have to rely on the limited recourse actions
which the conventions permit against the operator, which will be discussed
more fully below.")
" For a review of the conflicting principles which both civil and common law courts may apply
if an incident involving a signatory occurs outside of the territory of the Contracting States, see,
Nuclear Liability Legislation, supra note 21, at 872 n.42.
48 At this point, it may be instructive to note ways in which the various national laws on nu-
clear liability have assigned responsibility for the carriage of nuclear materials. The Austrian Act
provides, as a general rule, that the operator of a nuclear installation who is the consignor shall
remain liable until the goods have been taken in charge by the consignee. In the case of the import
of nuclear substances into Austria, the consignee-operator is liable from the time of loading of
such substances. The carrier is liable, however, where nuclear substances are merely in transit
through Austria, or where the nuclear substances are sent to Austria without the written consent
of the operator of a nuclear installation situated in Austria, or where the nuclear substances are
not consigned to a nuclear installation or such an installation cannot be identified. Interestingly
enough, however, the carrier can exonerate itself from liability by proving that it did not know
nor should have known that the substances were nuclear substances. Austrian Federal Act of
29 Apirl 1964 (effective 1 Sept. 1964), § 4(1) (2) (3) (iii). The Belgian Act of 18 July 1966
(effective 23 July 1966) holds the operator of a nuclear installation liable under the same cir-
cumstances as the Paris Convention. Belgian Act of 18 July 1966, Section 2. The Danish Act is
similar to the Belgian, with the exception that the Ministry of Justice reserves the right to shift
liability from the operator to the carrier when the operator gives his approval. Danish Act No.
170, 16 May 1967 (effective I July 1967), Chapter 3, 5 13(3), 14(1)(2), and 15. Under the
French Civil Code, the carrier would seem to be strictly liable as a custodian of a dangerous in-
strumentality causing damage. See, Nuclear Liability Legislation, supra note 21, at 879. However,
Act No. 65-955 promulgated on 12 Nov. 1965 as a temporary measure would seem to hold the
operator of a nuclear installation absolutely liable to the exclusion of any other person for damage
resulting from a nuclear incident occurring during the course of carriage on his account. Act of
12 Nov. 1965, § 3. The German statute exposes carriers of nuclear materials to liability as "hold-
ers" of dangerous material under a negligence theory imposing the highest standard of care.
However, the consignor of the shipment is under an obligation to indemnify the carrier for any
such liability. German Atomic Act of 23 Dec. 1959 (effective 1 Jan. 1960), as amended by the
Act of 23 April 1963, the Decree 22 Feb. 1962, itself amended by the Decree of 6 Aug. 1965,
5§ 26(1) (2) (3), 35(1) (2). The Italian law accords with the provisions of the Paris Convention
and provides that the operator of a nuclear installation shall not be liable when carriage is done
by the person in charge of transport on whom such liability is transferred under national law. Act
No. 1860 of 31 Dec. 1962 (effective 14 Feb. 1963) (Provisional, pending the entry into force in
Italy of the Paris Convention.), Chapter III, 55 16, 16(a) & 16(b). Japan, while not a signatory
of the Paris Convention, holds that the consignee-operator is liable for damage during the carriage
between two nuclear installations. Act Nos. 147-48 of 17 June 1961 (effective 15 Mar. 1962).
Like the Italian Act, the Netherlands Act is provisional on the coming into force of the Paris
Convention. It is interesting to note that the Dutch legislation attempts to reconcile the incon-
sistency found in the Paris Convention regarding the extension of the operator's liability into
the territory of a non-Contracting Party. Under the Dutch Act, the operator who consigns nuclear
substances shall be held liable for incidents occurring in the course of carriage until such time as
the substances have been taken in charge by the consignee-operator or have reached the territory
of the foreign country of destination. Th consignee-operator's liability for imported nuclear sub-
stances takes effect when such substances have reached Netherlands territory. Netherlands Act of
27 Oct. 1965, 55 5(a) (b) (c). The Spanish Act reproduces the essential principles of the Paris
Convention. Spanish Act of 29 April 1964 (effective 4 May 1964), 55 47, 48 & 50. The Swedish
law has adopted the principle of absolute liability for the operator as consignee or consignor. How-
ever, the carrier may also be sued where the damage is caused during the course of carriage. The
carrier then has a right of recourse against the operator up to the amount paid. Swedish Act of
3 June 1960 (effective 1 July 1960), § 4(b). The Swiss Act also holds the operator absolutely
liable. However, like the Netherlands, the Swiss law attempts to reconcile the operator's liability
as consignee or consignor with the effective jurisdiction of the legislation, i.e., where the operator
is consignee and the nuclear materials are imported from abroad, the operator is only liable for
damage caused in Switzerland. Swiss Act of 23 Dec. 1959 (effective 1 July 1960), 5
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The laws of three states which have signed the Paris Convention appar-
ently attempt to resolve this problem. Under the Netherlands Act of 27
October 1965, the operator-consignee is held liable for nuclear substances
"from the time when he takes them in charge, including nuclear sub-
stances imported into Netherlands territory from the time they have left
foreign territory."4 The Dutch, therefore, would limit the operator's
liability for carriage to damage or incidents which occurred within the
Netherlands. The Swiss nuclear liability statute is similar to that of the
Netherlands. The operator-consignee's liability is limited to damage "caused
in Switzerland" by nuclear materials imported from abroad."0 The United
Kingdom Nuclear Installations Act, on the other hand, provides that no
compensation is payable in respect to injury or damage incurred within a
non-Contracting State unless suffered by persons or property on an aircraft
registered in the United Kingdom or by such an aircraft."'
From the air carriers' point of view, of course, any language in the
conventions which may extend the operator's liability to incidents or
damage caused in non-Contracting territories must be treated as a wel-
come development. If the choice of law rules of the place of the incident
or damage make the conventions the governing law, then air carriers may
not be held primarily liable."2 Any inconsistency in the language of the
conventions, nevertheless, requires that air carriers take adequate insurance
precautions to cover all possible interpretations.
Another aspect of the operator's liability for carriage of nuclear goods
which is of interest to air carriers is the language used to designate the
time of the assumption or termination of that liability in the conventions.
Where the goods are to be carried between Contracting States, the con-
ventions employ the phrase "taking charge"; however, where the goods
are to be transported between a Contracting State and a non-Contracting
State, the phrase preferred by the drafters is "loaded on the means of
transport.""' Thus, if the operator is consignee, his liability commences
after he has "taken charge" of the nuclear materials coming from a
Contracting State or, if the goods come from the territory of a non-
Contracting State, after they have been "loaded on the means of trans-
port" by which they are to be carried from that territory. If, on the other
hand, the operator is the consignor, his responsibility ends when another
operator has "taken charge" of the nuclear materials or, if they are sent
12(2) (3) (4) (5). The British Act makes the operator (licensee) liable for all damage in the
course of the carriage done on his account, including imports with his agreement from a country
which is not a party to the Paris or Vienna Conventions. However, compensation is not payable
in respect of injury or damage incurred within a non-convention country unless incurred by per-
sons or property on a ship or an aircraft of British registry or by such a ship or aircraft. United
Kingdom Nuclear Installations Act of 1965 (effective 1 Dec. 1965), §§ 7(2), 11, 13(2), &
21(3).
" Netherlands Act of 27 Oct. 1965, § 5(b)(c).
"
5 Swiss Federal Act of 23 Dec. 1959, § 12(3).
"' United Kingdom Nuclear Installations Act of 1965, § 13 (2).
" In this respect, air carriers might even prefer a deletion of articles 2 and 23(a) of the Paris
Convention which specifically state that the Convention does not apply to nuclear incidents which
occur in the territory of non-Contracting States.
" Vienna Convention, art. If(I); IANEC Drafts are the same as Vienna; Paris Convention, art.
4.
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into the territory of a non-Contracting State, before they have been
''unloaded from the means of transport" by which they have arrived in
that territory.
Neither the expression "taken charge" or "loaded" is defined in the
conventions; for this reason, air carriers may expect to be involved in
litigation where these expressions are in issue. Of the two terms, the latter
will likely cause the greater difficulty. Air carriers ordinarily have the
duty to load or unload cargo and to furnish proper facilities for such
services 4 and will be liable for loss or injury sustained for negligent
performance.5 Thus, because of the undefined usage of the term "load,"
air carriers could be liable under national laws for damage caused by
nuclear incidents occurring during the loading or unloading of the sources
of nuclear energy. The obvious solution to this problem, of course, would
be to amend the conventions so that the term "taken charge," expressly
defined, would apply both where the carriage involves contacts with two
Contracting States and where the carriage is made between a Contracting
State and a non-Contracting State.56
Two remaining aspects of the operator's liability under the conventions
should be noted. First, if the nuclear damage is caused by a nuclear incident
occurring while the materials are in storage incidental to their carriage,
the conventions provide that the operator and not the bailee shall be
liable." Second, if the carriage involves materials consigned by a number
of different operators, the maximum total amount for which the operators
may be jointly and severally liable is the highest amount established with
respect to any of them pursuant to the conventions. There is no accumula-
tion of amounts for a nuclear incident in the course of transport.
B. Except "Under Any International Agreement
In The Field Of Transport"
As has already been observed, the conventions basically provide that
no one but the operator will be liable for nuclear damage caused by nuclear
incidents, including those which occur in the course of carriage. Both
Paris and Vienna, nevertheless, have a proviso clause to the effect that
54 13 C.J.S. § 67. This discussion assumes that the term "load" and "unload" will not be equated
with "storage incidental to the carriage" for which the operator remains liable. Vienna Convention,
art. 11(1); Paris Convention, art. 4; IANEC Drafts are identical to the Vienna language.
" Id. It has been held that, even though the carrier in loading uses appliances furnished by the
shipper himself, it will be liable for injuries resulting from defects in the appilances, if the appli-
ances were under the exclusive control of the carrier and there was no assumption of responsibility
on the part of the shipper.
" The Exposi des Motifs of the Paris Convention do not explain why the expression "loaded"
or "unloaded" was selected as distinct from "taking charge." See generally, Paris, ExposI des Motifs,
55 22-27.
" This provision was inserted in the Paris and Vienna Conventions at the request of the air
carriers. Vienna Convention, art. II(1), Proviso clause; Paris Convention, art. 4, recital clause;
IANEC Drafts are the same as Vienna.
" Except in the case of transport, the conventions provide that the liability of different operators
involved is joint and several and any of them may, therefore, be sued for the whole amount of the
damage. The total compensation available is, therefore, the aggregate of the sums of each of the
operators concerned. In any event, no operator is liable to pay more than the maximum amount
established for him in respect of a nuclear incident in accordance with amount established under
the conventions. Paris, Exposi des Motifs, 5 20 and 33; Vienna Convention, art. 11(3); IANEC
Drafts are the same as the Vienna Convention; Paris Convention, art. 5(d).
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they shall "not effect the application of any international agreement
[Vienna: "convention"] in the field of transport in force or open for
signature, ratification or accession at the date of this convention [Vienna:
"on which this convention is open for signature"].""' The 1ANEC Drafts,
on the other hand, would supersede any conflicting clauses in existing
international agreements in the field of transport between the ratifying
parties and, therefore, do not include a similar proviso clause.6" The import
of the above-quoted language in the Paris and Vienna Conventions is
quite clear: notwithstanding the basic design of the treaties, which is to
channel all liability to the operator of a nuclear installation, an air carrier
can still be held primarily liable for nuclear damage either under the
Warsaw Convention (or that Convention as amended by the Hague Proto-
col) or under the Rome Convention of 1952.61 Should an air carrier be
exposed to unlimited liability under any of these air transportation conven-
tions, it could conceivably incur claims for compensation in excess of the
limits of liability in force with respect to the operator of the nuclear instal-
lation." The practical implication of the proviso clauses is also apparent:
" Vienna Convention, art. II(5); Paris Convention, art. 6(b); 5 34 of the Exposi des Motifs
of the Paris Convention reads as follows:
It has been thought advisable not to interfere with existing international agree-
ments in the field of transport in force or open for signature, ratification or accession
at the date of the Convention, especially since countries outside Europe are parties
to them. International Agreements in the field of transport are understood to mean
international agreements dealing with third party liability for damage involving a
means of transport, international agreements dealing with collisions involving a means
of transport and international agreements dealing with bills of lading. To avoid the
possibility of conflicting provisions, it is laid down that the Convention does not
affect the application of such agreements (Article 6(b)).
60 IANEC Draft "A," art. XVII reads:
"As between states which ratify this Convention, this Convention shall supersede any inter-
national convention or agreement between the Contracting Parties which is in force, open for
signature, ratification or accession at the date on which this Convention is opened for signature,
but only to the extent that such convention or agreement is in conflict with the Convention." Art.
9 of Draft "B" is identical. During its fifth meeting, the Special Legal Committee agreed that the
question of supercession could more appropriately be settled by a specialized diplomatic conference.
REPORT OF THE SPECIAL LEGAL COMMITTEE, supra note 5, at 30, 83. At the first meeting of the
Special Legal Committee, the question of supercession was discussed. One delegate stated that the
United States had taken the position that the problems of atomic energy are so special that the
law of atomic energy should provide the only rule. For this reason, an Atomic Energy Convention
should supersede all previous conventions of a general nature, even those which have been signed
but have not come into effect. The majority opposition to this position had, in the past, apparently
been represented by the United Kingdom which took the view that it was desirable to keep in
force all existing conventions in the field of transportation which might have a bearing on the
atomic energy field, such as those governing civil aviation. Id. at 12.
61 Since the ICAO proposed conventions on aerial collisions and Air Traffic Control liability
were not open for signature at the time when the Paris and Vienna Conventions were themselves
open for signature, air carriers would, prseumably, be immune from primary liability should nuclear
damage become the object of a conflict between these conventions and the nuclear liability treaties.
62 Air carriers have recourse actions against the operator for claims paid under the air trans-
portation conventions up to the amount of the operator's limitation of libaility. These rights will
be discussed in further detail below. In the United States, several courts have recently subjected
air carriers to possible unlimited liability tander the Warsaw Convention for reasons other than
"willful misconduct" (art. 25); Mertens v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 341 F.2d 851 (2d Cir. 1965)
(military officer already on board on aircraft about to takeoff when ticket delivered); Warren v.
Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 352 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1965) (soldiers handed boarding pass at foot of
ramp leading to plane about to takeoff); Lisi v. Alitalia, 370 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1966).
(notice advising passenger of applicability of the Warsaw liability rules declared unreadable).
Unlimited carrier liability under the Rome Convention would presumably occur in accord-
ance with the provisions of article 12 of that Convention. At its Sixteenth Session, the
ICAO Legal Committee made reference to the relationship between the nuclear liability
treaties and the Rome Convention, insofar as liability for nuclear damage is involved. The Secretary
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air carriers may have to insure for very high amounts in spite of the
nuclear liability treaties."s
Obviously it would be in the interests of air carriers if both Paris and
Vienna followed the suggestion of the IANEC Special Legal Committee
and provided for supersession of conflicting sections of existing conven-
tions in the field of air transport.64 To obtain such amendments at this
late date would, no doubt, require lengthy negotiations amongst the parties
signatory to the conventions. An interim solution, however, may be
available to the benefit of air carriers. This would involve taking advan-
tage of those provisions in the conventions which permit air carriers to be
put in the place of the operator of a nuclear installation."5 In order for this
to happen, Contracting Parties must establish legislation under which air
carriers may be deemed liable in accordance with the conventions in the
place of the operator of a nuclear installation. Air carriers are required
to make a formal request to the competent public authority in the Con-
tracting State and to obtain the consent of the operator for whom it is
carrying nuclear materials. Once this has been done, the air carrier would
enjoy the limits of liability of the operator, although it would be restricted
in the number of recourse actions available.66
Undertaking such a procedure may not be of interest to air carriers
which do not specialize or concentrate in the carriage of nuclear goods."
However, for those which contemplate a large volume of such consign-
ments, and particularly if they do their own handling, the possibility of
being deemed the operator of a nuclear installation with attendant advan-
tages of a known and limited liability (albeit strict liability) may have
General of ICAO was requested to supply the ICAO Legal Sub-Committee on the Revision of the
Rome Convention with information concerning the nuclear liability conventions. The Legal Com-
mittee also elected to retain in Part "B" of its General Work Program the topic "Liability in
Respect of Nuclear Materials in Relation to Civil Aviation." Summary of the Work of the Legal
Committee During its Sixteenth Session (Paris, 5-22 Sept. 1967), ICAO Doc. 8704, LC/155,
22 Sept. 67.
"6 It is obvious that not everyone believes that channelling of all liability to the operator of
a nuclear installation is necessary for protection of the public or even desirable. See, e.g., Liability
Arising Out of Transportation of Nuclear Fuel, Radioactive Products or Waste--Channelling of
Liability, Legal Questions and Insurance Problems, Information Bulletin No. 13, Centre d'Etudes
de la Commission Permanente du Risque Atomique, Comite Europeen des Assurances, Zurich, Dec.
1966, at 27.
64Although the present language of the Paris and Vienna Conventions apparently represents
the majority view, the time may come when the understanding of the unique nature of radiation
damage and the high levels of security required to protect the public will dictate a change. It
seems that only Sweden's national legislation follows the peculiar logic of the present conventions
by permitting a carrier to be held liable along with the operator and, then, giving it a right of
recourse against the operator. Swedish Act, §§ 4(b) and 9(a) (b). Of course, if the nuclear liability
conventions do not include supercession provisions, it may be possible to amend the Warsaw and
Rome Conventions to provide that they do not apply where nuclear damage is covered by the
Paris or Vienna Conventions. Both Warsaw and Rome are currently being reviewed by ICAO.
Such a provision has recently been included in the International Convention for the Unification of
Certain Rules Relating to Carriage of Passenger Luggage by Sea, opened for signature at Brussels
on 27 May 1967, as follows in article 15: "This Convention shall not affect the provisions of
any international convention or national law which governs liability for nuclear damage."
" Vienna Convention, art. 11(2); IANEC Drafts are identical to Vienna language; Paris Con-
vention, art. 4(d).
6 The following States have nuclear liability laws which permit liability to be shifted from the
operator to the carrier: Denmark, Italy, Spain, and Switzerland. Danish Act, § 15; Italian Act, §
16; Spanish Act, § 50; and Swiss Act, § 12(4).
67 It is foreseeable that air carriers will become more involved in the carriage of nuclear material.
See, e.g., Beaton, Nuclear Fuel for All, 45 For. Affairs 662, 668 (1967).
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appeal. It would obviously be in the interests of such carriers to persuade
governments to provide legislation making such designations possible. "8
C. Recourse Actions Available To Air Carriers
Against Operators Of Nuclear Installations
As noted above, Paris and Vienna offer two rights of action to a person
suffering damage caused by a nuclear incident occurring in the course
of transportation of nuclear materials: first, against the operator liable
under the conventions and, second, against the air carrier liable under
existing international agreements in the field of transport. Having per-
mitted this deviation from the principle of channelling all liability to the
operator, however, the conventions proceed to grant limited rights of
recourse to air carriers against the operator for compensation paid for
damage caused by nuclear incidents under the transport agreements. In
addition, the treaties give certain air carriers qualified rights of recourse
for compensation paid under the laws of non-Contracting States."' Under
Vienna, "airlines" which are "nationals" of a Contracting Party may
acquire by subrogation the rights of anyone to whom they have paid
compensation either under an international convention or under the law
of a non-Contracting State. It is significant that no mention is made of
the location of the incident or the damage. Paris, on the other hand, pro-
vides that any "person" (whether or not he is a "national" of a Contract-
ing Party) who has paid such compensation under an international agree-
ment or the laws of a non-Contracting State may have subrogation rights
against the operator; however, if the incident or damage occurred in the
territory of a non-Contracting State, such rights may only be acquired
if the "person" paying the compensation has his "principal place of busi-
ness" in the territory of a Contracting Party. Thus, the Paris Convention
would discriminate against air carriers which did not have their "principal
place of business" in a Contracting State should the incident occur in the
territory of a non-Contracting State."
The language of the recourse provisions of the conventions raises
several questions. For example, what is the meaning of "national" of the
Contracting Party as that term is applied to an "airline" in the Vienna
6 At a meeting of the Panel of Experts of the IAEA, Aug. 1959, during the drafting of the
Vienna Convention, a paper was put forward advocating that the principle of channelling to the
operator should not apply where the carriage was undertaken by those who specialize in the trans-
portation of nuclear substances or where the incident occurred while the materials were in the pos-
session of a forwarding agent who specializes in the handling of nuclear materials. Liability Arising
out of Transportation of Nuclear Fuel, supra note 63, at 29-30.
69Vienna Convention, art. IX(2); IANEC Drafts are identical to the Vienna language; Paris
Convention, art. 6(d) (e).
"o Art. 6 (e) of the Paris Convention, unmodified by the additional Protocol of Jan. 1964, made
a token effort to eliminate the discrimination against air carriers from non-Contracting States by
providing that the OECD Council could decide that carriers whose principal place of business was
in the territory of a non-Contracting State may also enjoy rights of recourse against the operator
to the same extent as persons having their principal place of business in the territory of a Con-
tracting Party. In making this decision, the Council was to give due consideration to the general
provisions on third party liability in the field of nuclear energy in such non-Contracting State and
to the extent to which these provisions are available to the benefit of nationals of, or persons whose
principal place of business was in the territory of the Contracting Parties. See, Paris Convention,
Expos6 des Motifs, 5 37.
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clause? It is conceivable that a court may one day have to decide whether
that expression is restricted to airlines whose aircraft are registered in a
Contracting State or, more broadly, to those airlines which have agents
registered with the government of a Contracting Party. Again, both
Paris and Vienna imply that the subrogation rights acquired against the
operator impose upon him the obligation of reimbursing air carriers to the
full extent to which they may have paid compensation under an interna-
tional agreement.' If this is the case, it raises the possibility that an air
carrier may not be able to exercise his recourse rights because the operator's
required security fund is too low or has already been depleted in satisfying
direct actions. This, of course, again places the air carrier in the position of
having to make contingent insurance arrangements in spite of the con-
ventions.
Partial solutions to the shortcomings of the recourse procedures for air
carriers may be proposed. The most obvious course of action would be to
follow the example of the IANEC Drafts and to provide that Paris and
Vienna supersede the air carrier liability conventions insofar as they are in
force between Contracting Parties. This would eliminate the need for a
recourse action where the incident occurred in the territory of a Contract-
ing Party and would also do away with the requirement that the air
carrier appear as a defendant in the place of or with the operator who is
primarily liable. If, on the other hand, the cumbersome recourse arrange-
ment must be retained, air carriers might insist (as between Contracting
Parties which are also parties to Warsaw or Rome) that the limitations
of liability in the transport agreements be linked with the actual amount
which the air carrier can recover in a recourse action against the operator.
Still another solution, varying from that just mentioned, would be to amend
the nuclear liability conventions to provide that the operator's liability
in a recourse action by an air carrier based upon Warsaw or Rome should
be flexible enough to absorb the full amount of any compensation paid by
the air carrier in a direct action. 'Where the incident took place in a non-
Contracting State, and the recourse actions are to be based either upon
the law of a non-Contracting Party or upon an international air transport
convention, it is recommended that the conventions should not limit the
recourse action to airlines which are "nationals" or have their principal
place of business in Contracting States. Rather, it would seem more equit-
able in these circumstances to grant rights of recourse to all air carriers
which are engaged in carrying nuclear goods on behalf of an operator
designated by any Contracting Party at the time of the incident.
Air carriers' rights of recourse against the operator of a nuclear installa-
tion may also be influenced by other language in Vienna and the IANEC
Drafts. These conventions would exonerate the operator from liability
if he is able to prove that the nuclear damage resulted wholly or partly
from the "gross negligence" of persons (including corporations) suffering
"' Under the Vienna language, the subrogation rights shall be "up to the amount which he [air
carrier] has paid." Art. IX(2). The Paris language is identical. Art. 6(e). Nevertheless, the Exposd
des Motifs of the Paris Convention state that the recourse rights are only available "within the
limit laid down for the operator in question pursuant to Art. 7 of the Convention." 1 36.
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the damage."2 It is not clear whether the "gross negligence of the person
suffering the damage" would include the gross negligence of an air carrier
which may have been carrying the nuclear goods causing the incident,
which gives rise to its claim for a recourse action against the operator. It
seems apparent that the operator would remain liable to non-negligent
persons through the doctrine of "channelling," that is, he could be directly
liable along with the air carrier whose gross negligence led to the nuclear
incident. It is suggested that the air carrier should retain a right of
recourse against the operator even if the incident is found by a competent
court to have been caused by its "gross negligence." This is particularly
important because the use of the term "gross negligence" immediately
raises the old problem of the proper definition of "wilful misconduct" or
"dol" under the Warsaw Convention (as unamended by the Hague Proto-
col) ." If a court were to determine that an air carrier must incur unlimited
liability under Article 25 of the Warsaw Convention, and if no recourse
action were available against the operator under the Vienna or IANEC
Drafts Conventions, the risk to air carriers for the carriage of nuclear
materials could be great indeed.74 Perhaps one solution to this problem (if
it is a problem) would be to clarify the language of the Vienna Conven-
tion and the IANEC Drafts by stating specifically that the expression
"gross negligence of the person suffering the damage" does not include air
carriers and does not inhibit their rights of recourse. In the alternative, air
carriers may wish to include in their contracts with operators a provision
which clarifies this point. '
D. Recourse Actions Available To Operators Of Nuclear Installations
Against Air Carriers
The conventions also establish conditions giving the operator limited
rights of recourse for damage caused by nuclear incidents. Under Vienna,
Paris, and alternative "A" of the IANEC Drafts, the operator may recover
compensation paid up to the limits of the conventions against individuals
72Vienna Convention, art. IV(2); IANEC Drafts are identical. The operator only has this re-
lease if the competent court so provides in accordance with its law. The Paris Convention does not
contain a comparable provision. The term "person" as used in Vienna and the IANEC Drafts in-
cludes "any individual, partnership, any private or public body whether corporate or not, any in-
ternational organization enjoying legal personality under the law of the Installation State, and any
State or any of its constituent subdivisions." Vienna Convention, art. I(1) (a); IANEC Drafts are
identical to the Vienna language.
73 Art. 25 of the Warsaw Convention reads: "Le transporteur n'aura pas le droit de se privaloir
des dispositions de la prfsente Convention qui excluent ou limitent sa responsabilit6, si le dommage
provient de son dol ou d'une faute qui, d'apris la loi du tribunal saisi, est considirfe comme
equivalente au dol."
74 This problem may not arise under the Rome Convention because intent to cause damage must
be proven before unlimited liability is sanctioned. Rome Convention, art. 12. As noted above, the
operator of a nuclear installation obtains a right of recourse under all of the conventions if he
can prove intent to cause nuclear damage.
" It is interesting to note that the Special Legal Committee of the IANEC at its fifth meeting
(Feb. 1967) debated the advisability of retaining a provision in the Drafts which would relieve
the operator from liability to a "person who had been guilty of gross negligence." Some members
of the Committee favored the deletion of the reference to gross negligence in the interest of avoid-
ing ambiguity and protecting those injured. However, the Minutes of the meeting state that the
"majority of the Committee felt that a point of principle is involved here, and the present text
was continued." REPORT OF THE SPECIAL LEGAL COMMITTEE, supra note 5, at 62-63.
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who have caused a nuclear incident by an act or omission done with the
intent to cause the damage."0 The above agreements would also permit
operators recourse where this had been expressly provided in a written
contract."
IANEC Draft alternative "B" would give the operator a right of
recourse (based on fault) against any person who has manufactured
materials or equipment for, or who has furnished materials, equipment,
or services in connection with the design, construction, repair, or operation
of a nuclear installation, or who has transported or stored nuclear material.
This alternative marks a significant departure from the scheme of the
Vienna and Paris Conventions and is similar to a proposal put forth by
Argentina, Brazil, India, and the United Arab Republic at the Vienna
Conference." The members of the IANEC Special Legal Committee who
supported alternative "B" put forth several arguments: (1) that, in actual
business practice, it will be the law of supply and demand which should
prevail since suppliers and designers can protect themselves through appro-
priate contractual provisions; (2) that suppliers and designers might take
less care if they knew that there was no possible recourse against them;
(3) that the operators should not be made responsible for the faults of
designers or manufacturers located abroad; (4) that the right of recourse
does not affect the principle of channelling liability against the operator
since the principle of absolute and exclusive liability is applied only to
relations between the operator and the victim and, once the operator has
paid the compensation, the channelling principle will have reached its
objective; (5) that this is not a question of joint liability of operators, in
which case the burden would be distributed between them; (6) that the
operator should have the right of appeal against manufacturers or suppliers
of nuclear equipment or substances so long as he can prove that the dam-
ages were due to the fault of the latter; and (7) that arguments which
are economic in nature should not be used to determine questions which
essentially involve legal principles."
78 Vienna Convention, art. X; Paris Convention, art. 6(f); IANEC Draft "A," art. X, Alterna-
tive "A"; Draft "B," art. 6, Alternative "A."
77 Id. In the 1960 version of the Paris Convention, where a Contracting State subjected the
transit of nuclear substances through its territory to the condition that the maximum amount of
liability of the foreign operator concerned was increased up to the limit fixed for operators of
nuclear installations in its territories and a transit was carried out without his consent, the operator
concerned had a right of recourse against the carrier in question to the extent that he was liable
in excess of the amount fixed for him pursuant to the convention, except where the transit was
for the purpose of saving or attempting to save life or property or was caused by circumstances
beyond the control of the carrier. The apparent purpose of this provision was to discourage un-
authorized transit; however, the Additional Protocol of 1964 deleted the provision with the result
that the Paris Convention does not conflict with Vienna. Paris, Exposd des Motifs, 5 19. It is
interesting to note that the word "individual" acting or omitting to act intentionally refers to a
physical person and thus excludes the principle of respondeat superior. See also, REPORT OF THE
SPECIAL LEGAL COMMITTEE, supra note 5, at 63.
78 Doc. CN-12/2 at 21; The proposal was, of course, not adopted. See, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL
LEGAL COMMITTEE, supra note 5, at 104.
7' REPORT OF THE SPECIAL LEGAL COMMITTEE, supra note 5, at 104; the delegates from Brazil
and Mexico expressed the preference of their governments for alternative "B." The United States
preferred alternative "A." The delegate from Argentina abstained from taking a position. The
Committee agreed to leave the decision as to which alternative is preferred to a specialized diplo-
matic conference. Id. at 63.
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It is submitted that the reasons offered by the supporters of alternative
"B" of the IANEC Drafts run counter to the two basic purposes of the
conventions: protecting victims and encouraging the nuclear energy
industry. Pyramiding of insurance would probably take place if parties
other than the operator were held secondarily liable only upon proof of
fault. The argument that giving broad recourse rights to the operator does
not upset the principle of "channelling" is, in this light, quite fallacious.
The purpose of channelling is not merely to give a guarantee to victims
that they will be compensated, but also to assure that the party liable can
marshall the resources to provide adequate protection. Spreading the
liability by extending the operator's rights of recourse may jeopardize this
possibility, thus resulting in non-compensated victims. In this sense, the
Vienna and Paris regimes are seen as new and somewhat revolutionary
ideas; they should not, however, be dismissed as merely "economic in
nature" and therefore not involving "legal principles.""0 More to the point
of this paper, however, is the fact that the reasons given in support of
alternative "B" do not explain why air carriers as transporters of nuclear
goods should be made subject to recourse actions where the incident was
caused by their fault. Air carriers do not design or manufacture the nuclear
materials; moreover, it cannot be effectively argued that they would take
more care if they knew that they would be secondarily liable. More likely,
the threat of such liability for fault would either discourage air carriers
from transporting the sources of nuclear energy or, in the alternative,
make such transportation so expensive as to be prohibitive."1
As mentioned earlier, there may be some difficulty with the Vienna and
IANEC use of the term "gross negligence" in connection with air carriers'
rights of recourse against the operator of a nuclear installation. Clearly,
however, the operator is not liable to the individual who intentionally
caused a nuclear incident and he has a right of recourse against such an
individual. Since the term "individual" refers to a physical person and not
to a corporation, and precludes the doctrine of respondeat superior, pre-
sumably air carriers as corporate entities would be immune from the
operator's recourse action where- their servants had caused the incident
intentionally."'
8 Apposite here is Dean Roscoe Pound's well-known statement on the end of law: "I am con-
tent to think of law as a social institution to satisfy social wants-the claims and demands and
expectations involved in the existence of civilized society-by giving effect to as much as we may
with the least sacrifice, so far as such wants may be satisfied or such claims given effect by an
ordering of human conduct through politically organized society." POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, 47 (1922).
81 Usually the carrier would not be in a position to have any direct control over the packing
of nuclear substances. This would not preclude a carrier from making a safety check before ac-
cepting the consignment; however, even this may require a considerable investment by air carriers
and might force certain carriers to become specialists in the field. If this should be the case, as
noted earlier, carriers may wish to be declared "operators" for the purpose of clarifying their li-
ability and to qualify for the appropriate insurance or other security available.
"2 It is interesting to note that in alternative "B" of the IANEC Drafts, the term "individual"
is dropped in favor of the term "person." "Person" is defined in the Draft Conventions as "any
individual, partnership, any private or public body whether corporate or not, any international
organization enjoying legal personality under the law of the Installation State, and any state or any
of its constituent subdivisions." The use of the term "person" in alternative "B" was apparently
an error and should read "individual" with the intention of meaning a physical person and not
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A more important question, however, is the meaning of the expressions
"done with intent to cause damage" and "for fault of such person." If
the term "individual" or "person" as used in alternative "B" precludes
the concept of respondeat superior, would the operator have no recourse
rights beyond the individual even in the case where a court ruled that the
accident was due to "wilful misconduct" as the term is used in the Warsaw
Convention? Again, would the operator of a nuclear installation have no
recourse rights other than against the individual even where unlimited
liability was sanctioned against the air carrier in accordance with the
Rome Convention?"
The matter is further confused by the language in Article 6 (g) of the
Paris Convention which states that if the operator has a right of recourse
against "any person," than that "person" shall not to that extent have a
right of recourse against the operator. There being no link between the
term "individual" and "person" in the Convention, this provision is not
entirely clear. Perhaps one solution, at least to the benefit of air carriers,
would be to add to the Paris, Vienna, and alternative "A" language clari-
fying definitions of the term "individual" and the expression "with intent
to cause damage."
E. Other Considerations
Many other aspects of the conventions may influence the liability of air
carriers for damage or loss due to a nuclear incident occurring in the
course of the carriage of nuclear goods. These will be discussed topically.
1. "A Grave Natural Disaster of an Exceptional Character"
Although proof of fault is not required to establish the liability of an
operator, nevertheless, he is not totally deprived of defenses. All of the
conventions give him an immunity from liability where the damage
caused by a nuclear incident was due directly to "an act of armed con-
flict, hostilities, civil war" or "insurrection."" In addition, the operator
will not be liable for nuclear damage caused by a nuclear incident which
was directly due to "a grave natural disaster of an exceptional character,"
unless the law of the Installation State provides to the contrary." Thus, air
carriers may find themselves in the position of having to rely upon the
the "person" as defined in the Drafts or the Vienna Conventions. REPORT OF THE SPECIAL LEGAL
COMMITTEE, supra note 5, at 63.
"3 Assuming, of course, that the operator and the air carrier were jointly sued in one action
by injured parties.
0' Apparently the limitation of the operator's recourse to individuals rather than to corporate
defendants was regarded as a concession to the latter; however, it is difficult to understand why
the recourse action against an individual is retained at all in view of the likelihood that he would
be able to contribute very little to the relief of the operator. On the other hand, if the term "in-
tent" as used in the conventions is so broad as to require a showing of "awareness" of possibly un-
safe consequences, then it is likely that the corporate employer would become involved in any event
through his responsibility to corporate officials and employees in the form of insurance, indemnity,
etc. In this case, the conventions would again be bordering on the problem of creating a pyramiding
of insurance and getting away from the concept of channelling. See generally, Nuclear Liability
Legislation, supra note 21, at 876, 877.
8" Vienna Convention, art. IV(3) (a); IANEC Drafts are identical; Paris Convention, art. 9.
88Vienna Convention, art. IV(3) (b); IANEC Drafts use the Vienna language; Paris Conven-
tion, art. 9.
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defenses available under the various national laws should actions be
brought against them where the operator has successfully been granted
an immunity under the conventions.
It is doubtful whether an air carrier would be denied the right to defend
under these circumstances where the operator already has been successful
in so doing. However, a possible problem may arise in the construction of
the expression "a grave natural disaster of an exceptional character.""8
It is difficult to predict how courts may construe this language, but it is
conceivable that they will not equate it with the language of Article 20 (1)
of the Warsaw Convention which exonerates air carriers from liability
upon proof that they have taken all necessary measures to avoid the
damage. In addition, air carriers might remain liable under Article 5 of
the Rome Convention which permits exoneration of the operator of the
aircraft only "if the damage is the direct consequence of armed conflict
or civil disturbance." Thus, air carriers may be left solely liable when the
nuclear damage was caused by an incident during the course of transpor-
tation which was ultimately due to an unusual natural phenomenon."
It is difficult to suggest how air carriers could secure the same terms of
exoneration to themselves as are granted to operators, short of an amend-
ment to the conventions. For this reason, air carriers may wish to weigh
the possibility of problems created by the language which exonerates the
operator from liability in considering whether they should seek to be
"deemed" operators of nuclear installations where possible under the laws
of Contracting Parties.
2. "Nuclear Substances"-Nuclear Materials"
Another area where air carriers may wish to exercise prudence is in
determining whether their consignments are actually covered by the con-
ventions. Both Paris and Vienna, as well as the IANEC Drafts, limit the
liability of the operator to nuclear damage caused by the radioactive
properties of specified "nuclear material" (Vienna and IANEC Drafts)
" Five States-Belgium, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands and Spain-use the expression "grave
natural disaster of an exceptional character" in describing a circumstance which exonerates the
operator from liability under their nuclear liability laws. Belgian Act, § 2; Italian Act, § 15;
Japanese Act, § 3(1); Netherlands Act, § 8; and Spanish Act, § 45. The French and Swiss Acts
would permit exoneration of the operator if the damage was caused directly by an "exceptional
natural disaster." French Act, § 5; Swiss Act, § 14. The United Kingdom permits exoneration
in the case of "natural disasters." United Kingdom Act, § 13(4). Austria, Denmark, Germany
and Sweden do not mention acts of God or natural disasters of any kind as grounds for exonera-
tion. Austrian Act, § 9; Danish Act, § 16(2); German Act, § 26(1)(2); and Swedish Act, §
2 (iv). The United States Atomic Energy Act, § 170 (a), requires licensees to waive any exemption
from third party liability to which he may be entitled under Federal or State law. Since the Act
does not except "act of God" from the defenses waived, it would apparently permit liability where
the plaintiff claimed through it. See, The New Price-Anderson, supra note 4, at 167.
" According to the Exposi des Motifs of the Paris Convention, the expression "a grave natural
disaster . . ." does not include the classic exonerations owing to force majeure or acts of God;
rather, "a grave natural . ..etc." is one which is "catastrophic and completely unforeseeable." The
Exposd further points out that where the operator is exonerated, common law applies and those
responsible may "therefore be sued as ordinary tortfeasors." Exposi, supra, 5 48. Under the so-called
"Montreal Agreement" of 14 May 1966, air carriers undertaking the transportation of passengers,
to, from or through the United States specifically waive the defenses of Article 20(1) of the
Warsaw Convention.
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or "nuclear substances" (Paris)." This means that certain nuclear goods,
for example natural uranium and depleted uranium, are excluded from
the conventions. The conventions also exclude radioisotopes and nuclear
fuels which have been refined to the point where they can be used for
scientific, medical, or industrial purposes." In addition to the sources of
nuclear energy which are expressly excluded from the conventions, all of
the treaties provide that deliberative bodies of their sponsoring interna-
tional organizations (i.e., the IAEA, the OECD, and the IANEC) may
establish maximum limits for the exclusion of "small quantities" of the
sources of nuclear energy from the application of the conventions should
they deem that the risks occasioned by the use or carriage of the sources
obviate the extraordinary legal regimes created by the conventions."
In order to determine that their consignments fall within the terms of
the conventions, it will be imperative for air carriers to keep abreast of
the activities of the pertinent deliberative bodies and of the regulations
established by each of the Contracting Parties. It may also be advisable
before undertaking the carriage of the sources of nuclear energy to secure
from the origin, destination, and overflown States affidavits from the
highest authorities that the consignments are covered by the Conven-
tions.
9 2
A related matter of interest to air carriers is that the conventions do
not cover damage caused by ionizing radiation, either during the carriage
of nuclear materials or in the nuclear installation. They do, however,
permit Installation States to enact laws holding the operator liable for
ionizing radiation which occurs at the nuclear installation." This means
that air carriers may be exposed to liability for harm caused to goods or
passengers or other third parties due, for example, to radiation caused by a
SThese terms are defined in Vienna Convention, art. 1(1)(h); IANEC Drafts are the same
as Vienna; Paris Convention, art. 1(a)(v).
90 Article 1(a)(iv) of the Paris Convention excludes both nuclear fuels and radioisotopes out-
side a nuclear installation which are used or intended to be used for "any industrial, commercial,
agricultural, medical or scientific purposes." Article 1(1)(g) of the Vienna Convention and the
IANEC Drafts, on the other hand, would exclude only radiosotopes which have reached the final
stage of fabrication "so as to be useable for any scientific, medical, agricultural, commercial, or
industrial purpose." The Standing Committee of the IAEA has agreed that radioisotopes "useable"
for the purposes listed (Vienna) means the same as "used-or intended to be used" in the Paris
Convention.
91 Vienna Convention, art. 1(2); Paris Convention, art. 1(b); the IANEC Drafts are identical
to the Vienna Convention with the exception that the maximum limits for the exclusion of small
quantities established by the competent organ of the IANEC shall be within the limits established
by the Board of Governors of the IAEA. To relieve any doubts that the Vienna Convention per-
mits Installation States to exclude small quantities of nuclear material which are outside a nuclear
installation, the Board of Governors of the IAEA passed a resolution on September 11, 1964 clari-
fying this point (so long as the consignments comply with the provisions set forth in the Agency's
Regulations for the Safe Transport of Nuclear Materials). Standing Committee on Civil Liability
for Nuclear Damage, REPORT OF TaHE SECOND SERIES OF MEETINGS, Vienna, 23-27 Oct. 1967,
G. (CN/SC-14).
" This will be easier under the Paris regime than under the Vienna because the Steering Com-
mittee of the ENEA acts by itslf to determine which small quantities are excluded (rather than
having the individual States make their own determination against the standards set by the Com-
mittee). Paris Convention, art. 1(b). It is also interesting to note that the Paris Convention per-
mits the Steering Committee to exclude "any nuclear installation" as well as the sources of energy
if the risk is deemed to be small. Id.
" Vienna Convention, art. 1(1) (k) (iii); TANEC Drafts are identical to Vienna; Paris Con-
vention, art. 3 (c).
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leaky container in the cargo hold of the aircraft. Air carriers can, of
course, seek an indemnity arrangement with consignors and consignees for
such loss, but a better long-term solution would seem to call for an
amendment to the conventions permitting Contracting States to adopt
legislation which would hold the operator liable for ionizing radiation
both at the installation and during properly authorized carriage.
Another matter related to the nature of the consignments involves
the carriage of radioactive waste, particularly during waste disposal
operations. Article 1 (2) of Vienna and identical language in the IANEC
Drafts provides that Installation States may enact legislation permitting
carriers of nuclear material "or a person handling radioactive waste" to
be designated or recognized as the operator of a nuclear installation in the
place of that operator. (This procedure has been mentioned earlier as a
valuable concession to air carriers, especially those which contemplate
heavy traffic in the sources of nuclear energy.) Paris, on the other hand,
only permits carriers to be deemed operators in accordance with appro-
priate laws of the Contracting Parties. 4
The difference between the Paris and Vienna language has prompted
the question whether a carrier designated or deemed an operator of a
nuclear installation may engage in the carriage of radioactive waste in
that capacity, or whether its fictional designation as operator only applies
when the consignments do not include radioactive waste materials. This
problem was discussed by governmental experts during the preparation of
the Additional Protocol to the Paris Convention; the conclusion was that
the Paris language should be interpreted as including "a person handling
radioactive waste" and covers the case of a person carrying on the busi-
ness of disposing of such waste. In consequence, all of the provisions per-
taining to the carriage of nuclear substances in the Paris Conventions
would apply to the carriage of waste materials during waste disposal
operations."' It may, therefore, behoove air carriers which wish to be
deemed operators in accordance with the Paris Convention to seek a
certification from the appropriate Contracting Party to the effect that
the special liability regime of the Convention will apply in the case of
carriage in connection with radioactive waste disposal operations.
A final problem with the nature of the consignments may occur where
the carrier has on board nuclear materials consigned by or to more than
one operator of a nuclear installation. Should an incident occur during
the carriage, and the air carrier be held liable under one of the air trans-
port liability conventions, the question may arise as to which of the
operators of a nuclear installation is secondarily liable in a recourse action.
This, of course, may give rise to serious questions of causation which will
be touched upon below. The basic question of assignment of responsibility,
however, is answered in the conventions which provide that the operator
shall be jointly and severally liable."
94 Paris Convention, art. 4(d).
95 Points Discussed, supra note 7, at 7.
"8Vienna Convention, art. 11(3); IANEC Drafts are identical to the Vienna language; Paris
Convention, art. 5 (d).
1968 ]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
The question naturally arises as to what would happen should one
consignment consist of a nuclear substance or material as defined in the
conventions, and another on the same flight, be considered to be a "small
quantity" and, therefore, by itself, excluded under the terms of the con-
ventions. Would air carriers be able to demonstrate that the nuclear
damage was caused by a nuclear incident involving the radioactive prop-
erties of the consignment which came within the definition of nuclear sub-
stances or material? Should either consignor or consignee be permitted to
defend against an air carrier's recourse action on the grounds that it
could not be shown that the nuclear incident actually causing the nuclear
damage involved radioactive properties from his consignment? The obvious
solution to this problem is for air carriers to avoid such multiple consign-
ments on the same aircraft or in the same place of storage incidental to
the carriage.
3. Evidence of Financial Security
All of the conventions require the operator "liable" to provide the
carrier with a certificate (issued by or on behalf of the operator's insurer
or financial guarantor) which states the amount, type, and duration of
the security and the sources of nuclear energy in respect of which the
security applies." The conventions further provide that the statements
made on the certificate may not be disputed by the person providing the
financial security. Air carriers should take care that they are in receipt of
these certificates before undertaking to transport nuclear goods on behalf
of an operator. To do so, however, may be difficult for air carriers when
the consignor is a national of a non-Contracting State and the carriage is
between non-Contracting States and Contracting States. It will be recalled
that the consignee-operator in this situation does not assume liability until
the sources of nuclear energy have been loaded upon the means of trans-
port with his prior written consent, and, therefore, it will be incumbent
upon air carriers to procure the certificate from the consignee-operator in
the Contracting State."
4. Liability for Damage to the Means of Transport
A peculiarity of the conventions, and one which may be of considerable
importance to air carriers, is that the operator is not liable for nuclear
damage to the means of transport upon which the sources of nuclear
energy were being carried at the time of the incident." As has been noted
earlier, this anomoly is apparently the result of pressure on the drafters
by certain insurance interests who regarded the carriers as tantamount to
"r Vienna Convention, art. III; Paris Convention, art. 4(c); IANEC Drafts are identical to the
Vienna language.
" It is interesting to note that the Standing Committee on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage
of the IAEA has been working on a uniform certificate for carriers which would state that the
liability of the operator for transport involving non-Contracting States would not take place until
the material has been unloaded from or after it was loaded on the means of transport. REPORT ON
SECOND SERIES OF MEETING, 23-27 Oct. 1967.
" Vienna Convention, art. IV(S); Paris Convention, art. 3(a); IANEC Drafts are the same as
Vienna.
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a third party in relation to the operator.'" It may be that the operator
would remain liable under the common law of the Contracting State.
There is some support for this position in that the operator is expressly
exonerated in the conventions for liability "under this convention"
(Vienna) or "in accordance with this convention" (Paris). Should this
not be the case, however, air carriers could attempt to exact a waiver of
the conventions' defense from the operator in the manner of the recent
amendments to the Price-Anderson Act. This waiver might also include
a provision requiring the operator to obtain appropriate insurance to cover
damage to the means of transport.
5. Causation
Perhaps the greatest shortcoming of the conventions will prove to be
the failure to elaborate expressly on the quantum and nature of the evi-
dence of nuclear damage which must be demonstrated in order to invoke
the liability of the operators. As written, the conventions merely state that
the operator shall be liable "upon proof that such damage [nuclear dam-
age] has been caused by a nuclear incident. 1 . The procedural or adjectival
law which will define the level of proof required and decide questions of
cause-in-fact and cause-in-law will be that of the court seized of the case,
that is, the so-called "competent court." ' 2
There are two specific reasons why the terms "proof" and "caused by"
should be clarified: (1) the social policy underlying the conventions and
(2) the peculiar nature of radiation injuries. There can be little doubt
today that the quantum of proof and the meaning of the term cause-in-
fact are not "policy neutral concepts," but are viewed by the governments
and courts as key ingredients in the enforcement of certain public
policies."0 Certainly the nuclear liability conventions are not "policy
neutral;" on the contrary, a very rigid regime of liability is being estab-
lished in order to protect innocent third parties. In this light, it seems
quite absurd to leave to the various national courts the determination of
key questions which could upset, in practice, the basic policies of the
conventions. In addition, parties whose responsibilities may be affected by
the conventions, such as air carriers, deserve to have a greater foreknowl-
edge of these matters in order to make fair and proper decisions on self
protection, legal tactics, and strategy in the event of lawsuits. A collateral
benefit from such knowledge would be the expeditious disposition of
"nuisance suits" which are foreseeable under the conventions.
The second reason in favour of a more explicit statement of the terms
"proof" and "caused by" is the unusual nature of radiation injury. In the
familiar cases of accidents involving aircraft, it may be said that the
temporal sequence between the cause-in-fact and the alleged injury is
100SEN (59) 79, supra note 36.
... Vienna Convention, art. H(1); Paris Convention, art. 3 (a); IANEC Drafts are the same as
Vienna.
" Vienna Convention, arts. XI, XII, and XIII; Paris Convention, arts. 13 (a) (b) (c) (d) and
14; IANEC Drafts are virtually the same as Vienna on this point.
.. O'Toole, supra note 4, at 751-65.
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quite close. The onset of radiation damage, on the other hand, may take
several years from the date of cause-in-fact, and, even then, may require
elaborate scientific evidence to show only a probability that the harm was
the result of the alleged exposure."4 As a consequence, it is conceivable
that (in the absence of clarification in the conventions) courts in various
jurisdictions may hold the operator and/or air carrier liable in some cases,
while in other jurisdictions courts may find just the opposite on the same
evidence, particularly where multiple consignments are involved."0 5
Several suggestions have been made to alleviate the hardships which
may confront defendants and claimants alike because of the long temporal
sequence between the cause and the harm in radiation cases. One ameliorat-
ing proposal would have the burden of proof based on established statisti-
cal probabilities; here, the claims would be paid relatively promptly on
the basis of prospective disability.'" Pehraps a more practical solution is
that which Professor Estep of the University of Michigan has proposed.
Professor Estep's plan envisages the establishment of a "contingent injury
fund" based on statistical experience. Claimants would provide evidence
of exposure in order to make a recovery. The operator and other poten-
tially liable parties, such as air carriers, would, presumably, be able to
provide an adequate reserve by insurance based upon the average award
or on a set maximum amount."' A similar contingent injury fund formed
part of the recent amendments to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 in the
United States; but in this case the insurers only provide emergency assist-
ance payments to members of the public following a nuclear accident,
such as food, housing, and medical services. These benefits would be cred-
ited against any final judgment, but would not be construed as an admis-
sion of liability, and, for that reason, no release or compromise would be
exacted from the person benefitted."' (A proposal along the lines of the
United States AEC amendments was also made by the Mexican delegate
to the Special Legal Committee of the IANEC and has been referred to
the body for study."° )
6. Distribution of Compensation
Under the conventions, the nature, the form, and the "equitable dis-
tribution" of compensation is left to the lex fori of the competent court."'
For this reason there are no guarantees that there will be any funds
remaining with the operator to meet recourse claims by air carriers under
the conventions. This may be looked upon as a shortcoming in the design
of the treaties inasmuch as it seems rather fatuous to suggest that a right
has been given to air carriers, when, upon execution, this may amount to
nothing more than an unsupported contingency. The obvious way out of
104 Id.
'"See, Nuclear Liability Legislation, supra note 21, at 881-89.
'0'Id. at 885.
'
0 1d. at 899.
108 The New Price-Anderson, supra note 4, at 164.
'09 REPORT OF THE SPECIAL LEGAL COMMITTEE, supra note 5, at 37.
110Vienna Convention, art. VIII; Paris Convention, art. 11; lANEC Drafts are identical to
Vienna.
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this situation is to amend the conventions to provide that the operators
shall remain responsible for claims paid by air carriers. Failing such amend-
ments, it is conceivable that air carriers could exact from the operator an
indemnification agreement, although the enforceability of such a contract
is questionable as long as the conventions remain unamended.
An expression of concern about the distribution of compensation was
made recently at the Second Series of Meetings of the Standing Committee
of the IAEA (October 1967). After discussion, however, the Committee
could only conclude that should the entire fund be exhausted and "there
is nothing left to satisfy later claims which may be made for delayed
damage... it would be up to each government to cope with the situation
in accordance with its national legislation.""'. . This attitude on the part of
the Standing Committee would suggest that an attempt to amend the
conventions at this time would not be well received.1"'
7. Extinguishment of Rights to Compensation Arising Under the
Conventions
The provisions of the conventions which extinguish rights to compen-
sation thereunder reflect an appreciation of the long temporal sequence
which may occur between the cause and harm in incidents involving
radiation. All of the treaties require claims to be brought within ten
years from the date of the nuclear incident, unless the operator is insured
for a longer period and national laws so provide."' (If the nuclear incident
occurs at a time when the sources of nuclear energy were either stolen,
lost, jettisoned, or abandoned, the time limit is extended to twenty years
from the date of the incident.1 4 )
Notwithstanding the relatively lengthy periods in which claims may be
brought, there are also provisions which permit Contracting States to
provide by law for shorter periods of time if the person suffering the
damage had knowledge of or should have known about the damage. Under
Vienna and the IANEC Drafts the minimum time which Contracting
Parties may establish is three years; under Paris it is two years.1"'
It should be noted that the shortest permissable period is the maximum
time period for claims under both the Warsaw and Rome Conventions." '
All of the other time limits are longer than in these two air transport
conventions. The consequence of this is obvious: should claims not be made
within the time limits in Warsaw and Rome, then the air carier is released
from liability thereunder, and the only action remaining is against the
operator of the nuclear installation. On the other hand, if an air carrier
... Standing Committee on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, REPORT ON THE SECOND
SERIES, 7, Vienna, 23-27 Oct. 1967.
11 It is interesting to note that the United States AEC believes that, should the total claims
exceed the amount of private protection and governmental indemnity, then the Federal District
Courts could order a concursus of claims and a stay of pending proceeding under Bankruptcy
jurisdiction. Nuclear Liability, supra note 4, at 895.
11sa Vienna Convention, art. VI(1); Paris Convention, art. 8(a); IANEC are the same as Vienna.
"' Vienna Convention, art. VI(2); Paris Convention, art. 8(b); IANEC are identical to Vienna.
"' Vienna Convention, art. VI(3); Paris Convention, art. 8(c); IANEC repeat Vienna.
... Warsaw Convention, art. 29(1); Rome Convention, art. 21(1).
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has paid compensation under the air transport conventions and thereby
acquires a recourse action against the operator, it is clear that it would
have ample time in which to make its claim under the nuclear liability
conventions.
IV. Conclusion
The contents of this paper, or perhaps the approach, may convey the
impression that air carriers have not fared too well under the nuclear
liability conventions. This was not intended. While there appear to be
many shortcomings in the conventions which may have adverse conse-
quences for air carriers, most of these can be dealt with by precautionary
arrangements prior to the carriage of nuclear goods. In addition, air
carriers may stand to gain a great deal from wide acceptance of these
treaties. It is important in assessing the conventions to remember that
liability problems in connection with the transportation of the sources of
nuclear energy and the protection of carriers were not prime objectives of
the agreement; rather, the basic purposes seem to have involved protecting
innocent third parties from uncontrolled radiation and stimulating the
development of nuclear installations in various countries, even at the risk
of a major catastrophe. The interests of air carriers were well represented
at the many drafting sessions preceding the Paris Convention and at the
Diplomatic Conference leading to the Vienna Convention (which serves
as the basis of the IANEC Draft Conventions). A perusal of the working
papers and preliminary reports which underlay both Paris and Vienna
discloses that several provisions which could have been quite adverse to
the liability position of air carriers were deleted before the final drafts
were completed. In addition to precautions which air carriers may take
by express contracts and other means to clarify ambigious or even onerous
provisions, the suggestion has been made that air carriers may wish simply
to be designated as operators of nuclear installations where national laws
permit. All of the conventions offer this alternative and, in the long run,
it may be the best and safest procedure for carriers which are interested
in transporting nuclear goods on a large scale after the conventions come
into force.
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